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von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex decompositions of TU games
Abstract
We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition
of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications
and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas’ five player game with a unique
stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.
Resum
En l’article s’estudia sota quines condicions el nucli d’un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat
transferible que forma part d’una descomposicio´ convexa d’un altre joc e´s un conjunt es-
table, en el sentit de von Neumann i Morgenstern, del joc descomposat. Tambe´ s’analitzen
alguns exemples nume`rics i aplicacions.
Keywords: Cooperative games, convex games, stable sets
JEL: C71
1 Introduction
The first historical solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility (games,
for short) was proposed and studied in the seminal book of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). It is referred to as stable set or von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. There, a
stable set of a game is defined to be a set V of imputations satisfying internal stability (no
element in V is dominated by other element in V) and external stability (every element
outside V is dominated by some element in V).
Lucas (1968) provides an example that gives a negative answer to the general question
about the existence of stable sets for any game. Nevertheless, it is possible to find games
with a plethora of stable sets. It is well-known that any stable set contains the core,
which is always internally stable. When the core is also externally stable, then it is the
unique stable set. However, there are balanced games with a unique stable set different
from the core. This situation was showed by Lucas (1992) by means of the following
game:1 let (N, v) be the 5-person game where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, v(N) = 2, v({1, 2}) =
v({3, 4}) = v({1, 3, 5}) = v({2, 4, 5}) = 1, and v(S) = 0 for all other S ⊂ N . What is
specially interesting for our purposes is to see that the superadditive cover of the previous
game, (N, vˆ), can be easily described by decomposing the game as the maximum of a
finite set of convex games: vˆ = max
{
u{1,2} + u{3,4}, u{1,3,5} + u{2,4,5}
}
, where uS, for all
∅ 6= S ⊆ N, denotes the unanimity game associated to coalition S. It is well-known
that the superadditive cover process (Gillies, 1959) preserves the imputations set, the
core and the stable sets whenever the original game satisfies v(N) ≥
∑
C∈P v(C), for any
partition P ⊆ 2N of N , which is the case in the above example. As shown by Lucas,
the superadditive cover (and so the game itself) of the above game has a unique stable
set which is described by V = {(x1, . . . , x5) ∈ R5+ | x1 + x2 = 1, x3 + x4 = 1, x5 = 0},
being different from its core which is C(N, v) = {(α, 1 − α, 1 − α, α, 0) | 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}.
Notice that the unique stable set V coincides with the core of the first convex game
described in the max-convex decomposition of the game vˆ; i.e. V = C
(
N, u{1,2} + u{3,4}
)
.
A similar situation can be described by using simple monotonic games. For instance,
1See Section 2 for formal definitions.
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consider the following 3-person simple majority game: N = {1, 2, 3}, v(N) = v({1, 2}) =
v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 1 and v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0. This game can be rewritten
as v = max
{
u{1,2}, u{1,3}, u{2,3}
}
. It is well-known that C
(
N, u{1,2}
)
, C
(
N, u{1,3}
)
and
C
(
N, u{2,3}
)
are stable sets of this 3-person simple majority unbalanced game. But in
this second example there are many others stable sets, one of them being the discrete set
{(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0
)
,
(
0, 1
2
, 1
2
)
,
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)}
, which can not be reached as the core of any related game.
In a previous work, Llerena and Rafels (2006) show that any game can be expressed,
in many different ways, as the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. Moreover,
if the game is zero monotonic there exists at least a max-convex decomposition where
the games involved have the same imputation set. These general decomposition results,
together with the above line of argument, open a natural question: which are the rela-
tionships between the core of the games involved in a max-convex decomposition and the
stable sets of the decomposed game?
With these objectives in mind, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
notation and definitions. Section 3 analyzes the external stability of the intersection
between the Weber set and the imputation set of two games related by the usual order.
We complete this result stating sufficient conditions to guarantee when the core of a
convex game taking part in a max-decomposition happens to be a stable set of the initial
game. Section 4 contains examples and applications.
2 Notation and terminology
We denote by N = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of players. A transferable utility cooperative game
(a game) is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and v : 2N −→ R is
the characteristic function with v(∅) = 0 and 2N denotes the set of all subsets (coalitions)
of N . For any coalition S ⊆ N , N\S = {i ∈ N | i 6∈ S}. We use S ⊂ T to indicate strict
inclusion, that is S ⊆ T but S 6= T . By |S| we denote the cardinality of the coalition
S ⊆ N . Given a game (N, v) and a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N , we define the subgame
(S, v|S) as v|S(Q) := v(Q), for any Q ⊆ S. Given two games (N, v1), (N, v2), v1 ≤ v2
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means that v1(S) ≤ v2(S), for all S ⊆ N. The maximum game (N, v) generated by the
set {(N, vt}t=1,...,k is defined as v(S) := max{v1(S), . . . , vk(S)}, for all S ⊆ N. A partition
of any set S is a collection of non-empty subsets {T1, . . . , Tk} such that T1 ∪ . . .∪ Tk = S
and, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j, Ti ∩ Tj = ∅. Let P(S) denote the set of all partitions
of S. Then, the superadditive cover of (N, v) is the game (N, vˆ) defined as vˆ(S) :=
max
{∑k
j=1 v(Tj) | {T1, . . . , Tk} ∈ P(S)
}
, for all S ⊆ N. Given a coalition T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅,
the unanimity game (N, uT ) is defined as
uT (S) :=


1 if T ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
(1)
The set of unanimity games {(N, uT ) | ∅ 6= T ⊆ N} forms a basis of the linear space of
the set of N -person games, and the coordinates of a game in this basis are the unanimity
coordinates (or Harsanyi dividends) of the game. For any (N, v), v =
∑
∅6=T⊆N λT · uT ,
where λT =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S| v(S), for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N.
Let RN stand for the space of real-valued vectors x = (xi)i∈N and for all S ⊆ N ,
x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi, with the convention x(∅) = 0. For each x ∈ R
N and T ⊆ N, x|T denotes
the restriction of x to T : x|T := (xi)i∈T ∈ RT . Given two vectors x, y ∈ RN , we denote by
[x, y] the closed line segment joining x and y. Formally, [x, y] := {λ · x+ (1− λ) · y | 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1}.
For each game (N, v), the set of feasible payoff vectors is defined by X∗ := {x ∈
RN | x(N) ≤ v(N)}. A solution on the set of all games is a mapping σ which as-
sociates with each game (N, v) a subset σ(N, v) of X∗(N, v). The pre-imputation set
of a game (N, v) is defined by X(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N)}, and the set of
imputations by I(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N) andxi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}.
A game with a non-empty set of imputations is called essential. The core of (N, v)
is the set of those imputations where each coalition gets at least its worth, that is
C(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) |x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}. A game with non-empty
core is called balanced. A game (N, v) is convex (Shapley, 1971) if, for all S, T ⊆ N ,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ). Each unanimity game (N, uT ) is convex. A game
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(N, v) is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T ), for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N , and zero monotonic if its zero
normalization (N, v0), where v0(S) = v(S) −
∑
i∈S v({i}), for all S ⊆ N , is a monotonic
game or, equivalently, v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≥ v({i}), for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N \ {i}. A
game (N, v) is N -monotonic if for all S ⊆ N , v(S) +
∑
i∈N\S v({i}) ≤ v(N).
A permutation θ ∈ ΘT over a non-empty coalition T ⊆ N is a bijection from {1, . . . , |T |}
to T . We denote by ΘT the set of all permutations over T . For any ∅ 6= T ⊂ N , any
θ ∈ ΘT and any θ
′
∈ ΘN\T , we define the appending permutation θ
∗ = (θ, θ
′
) ∈ ΘN as
follow:
θ∗(i) :=


θ(i) if 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
θ
′
(i− t) if t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Given a game (N, v) and a permutation θ ∈ ΘN , themarginal worth vector associated to θ,
denoted by mvθ ∈ R
N , is defined as mvθ(k) = v({θ(1), . . . , θ(k)})− v({θ(1), . . . , θ(k − 1)}),
for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and mvθ(1) = v({θ(1)}). The convex hull of the marginal worth
vectors is called the Weber set, W (N, v) := convex {mvθ}θ∈ΘN . A game (N, v) is convex
if and only if W (N, v) = C(N, v) (Shapley, 1971; Ichiishi, 1981).
Given two pre-imputations x, y ∈ X(N, v), we say that x dominates y, in short
x domv y, if there exists a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N such that xi > yi, for all i ∈ S,
and x(S) ≤ v(S). For X ⊆ I(N, v) we denote by DomvX the set of all imputations
dominated by some imputation of the set X. Formally, DomvX = {y ∈ I(N, v) | ∃ x ∈
X, x domv y}. Let (N, v) be an essential game. A set of imputations ∅ 6= V ⊆ I(N, v) is
a stable set for the game (N, v) if it satisfies the next two conditions:
1. V is v-internally stable: no imputation in V dominates another imputation in V .
Formally, V ∩Domv V = ∅.
2. V is v-externally stable: any imputation outside the set V is dominated by some
imputation in V . Formally, V ∪Domv V = I(N, v).
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3 Stable sets and convex decompositions of games
In this section we study under which conditions the core of the games involved in a max-
convex decomposition turn out to be stable sets of the decomposed game. We begin
stating a general result about the external stability of the intersection between the Weber
set and the imputation set of two ordered games with the same efficiency level.
Theorem 1 Let (N, v1), (N, v2) be two games such that v1 ≤ v2, v1(N) = v2(N), and
v1(S) +
∑
i∈N\S
v2({i}) ≤ v2(N), for all S ⊆ N. (1)
Then,
1. (C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)) ∪ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)) = I(N, v2).
2. W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) is a non-empty set and it is v2-externally stable.
3. If W (N, v1)∩ I(N, v2) is a stable set for (N, v2), then C(N, v1)∩ I(N, v2) is a stable
set for (N, v2) and both coincide.
Proof:
1. Note that we only have to see that
I(N, v2)\(C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)) ⊆ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)).
Let (N, v3) be defined as
v3(S) := max
R⊆S

v1(R) +
∑
i∈S\R
v2({i})

 , for all S ⊆ N. (2)
Clearly, v1 ≤ v3, and from the hypothesis of the theorem it follows v1(N) = v2(N) =
v3(N). On the other hand, v3({i}) = v2({i}) for all i ∈ N, and thus I(N, v3) =
I(N, v2). It can be easily checked that C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) = C(N, v3). Moreover,
(N, v3) is zero monotonic. Indeed, let i ∈ N, S ⊆ N \ {i} and R
∗ ⊆ S such
that v3(S) = v1(R
∗) +
∑
j∈S\R∗ v2({j}). Then, v3(S ∪ {i}) − v3(S) ≥ v1(R
∗) +
∑
j∈S∪{i}\R∗ v2({j})− v1(R
∗)−
∑
j∈S\R∗ v2({j}) = v2({i}) = v3({i}).
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Let x ∈ I(N, v2)\(C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)) and T be a minimal coalition (w.r.t. in-
clusion) such that x(T ) < v3(T ). Let R ⊂ T. Then, v3(T ) > x(T ) = x(R) +
x(T \ R) ≥ v3(R) +
∑
i∈T\R v2({i}) ≥ v1(R) +
∑
i∈T\R v2({i}). Now, from the def-
inition of (N, v3) we get v3(T ) = v1(T ). Let us define the games (N\T,wk), where
k ∈ {1, 3}, as follow: wk(S) := vk(S ∪ T ) − vk(T ), for all S ⊆ N \ T. Note that
w1(S) ≤ w3(S) for all S ⊂ N \ T and w1(N \ T ) = w3(N \ T ), and consequently
W (N \ T,w1) ∩ W (N \ T,w3) 6= ∅ (Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Rafels, 2004). Let
z ∈W (N \ T,w1) ∩W (N \ T,w3) and y ∈ RN be defined as follows:
yi :=


xi + α if i ∈ T, where α =
v1(T )−x(T )
|T |
zi if i ∈ N\T.
Next we show that y ∈ W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) and y dom
v x. From the minimality
of T , for all S ⊂ T we have y(S) = x(S) + α · |S| > x(S) ≥ v3(S) ≥ v1(S).
The above condition, together with the equality y(T ) = v3(T ) = v1(T ), implies
y|T ∈ C(T, v1|T ) = C(T, v1|T ) ∩ C(T, v3|T ) ⊆ W (T, v1|T ) ∩W (T, v3|T ). Thus, y|T =∑
θ∈ΘT
λθ · m
v1|T
θ . Moreover, since y|N\T = z ∈ W (N \ T,w1), we have y|N\T =∑
θ
′∈ΘN\T
µθ′ · m
w1
θ
′ , where λθ ≥ 0, µθ′ ≥ 0,
∑
θ∈ΘT
λθ = 1 and
∑
θ
′∈ΘN\T
µθ′ = 1.
Now, from the definition of the game (N\T,w1) we have y =
∑
θ∗=(θ,θ
′
)∈ΘN
(λθ ·µθ′ ) ·
mv1θ∗ , where θ ∈ ΘT and θ
′ ∈ ΘN\T , or equivalently, y ∈ W (N, v1). In a similar
way we can see that y ∈ W (N, v3). From the zero monotonicity of (N, v3) and the
equality I(N, v3) = I(N, v2), we have y ∈ I(N, v2). Finally, since for all i ∈ T ,
yi > xi and y(T ) = v1(T ) ≤ v2(T ), we conclude that y dom
v2 x via T .
2. From statement 1, I(N, v2) = (C(N, v1)∩I(N, v2))∪ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1)∩I(N, v2)) ⊆
(W (N, v1)∩ I(N, v2))∪ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1)∩ I(N, v2)) ⊆ I(N, v2), and consequently
(W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)) ∪ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)) = I(N, v2). By condition (1)
we have I(N, v2) 6= ∅, which implies the non-emptiness of W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) and
the v2-external stability.
3. By hypothesis, W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) is a stable set for (N, v2), and thus (C(N, v1) ∩
I(N, v2)) ∩ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1)∩I(N, v2)) ⊆ (W (N, v1)∩I(N, v2))∩ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1)∩
8
I(N, v2)) = ∅. This fact, together with statement 1, implies (C(N, v1)∩ I(N, v2)) =
I(N, v2)\ Dom
v2 (W (N, v1)∩I(N, v2)) =W (N, v1)∩I(N, v2), and the desired result
is reached.
The next example shows that condition (1) is needed to guarantee non-emptiness of
the intersection between the Weber set and the imputation set.
Example: Let v1 = 3 · u{1,3} and v2 = max
{
u{2}, 2 · u{1,2}, 3 · u{1,3}, u{2,3}
}
. It can be
easily checked that W (N, v1) = [(3, 0, 0), (0, 0, 3)] and W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) = ∅, but
v1({1, 3}) + v2({2}) = 4 > v2(N) = 3.
Notice that the hypothesis of Theorem 1 holds for two ordered games (N, v1), (N, v2),
with v1 ≤ v2, such that either (a) v1(N) = v2(N) and (N, v2) is N-monotonic, or (b)
C(N, v1)∩I(N, v2) 6= ∅. In case (a), condition (1) comes directly from the N-monotonicity
of (N, v2) and the fact that v1(N) = v2(N). In case (b), taking x ∈ C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2)
and S ⊂ N, we get v1(S)+
∑
i∈N\S v2({i}) ≤ x(S)+x(N \S) = v2(N). As a consequence,
we obtain the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Let (N, v1), (N, v2) be two games such that v1 ≤ v2. If either
1. (N, v2) is N-monotonic and v1(N) = v2(N), or
2. C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) 6= ∅,
then W (N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) is a non-empty set and it is v2−externally stable.
A direct and useful consequence for our purposes is the following.
Corollary 2 Let (N, v1), (N, v2) be two games such that v1 ≤ v2, v1(N) = v2(N), and
condition (1) holds. If (N, v1) is convex, then C(N, v1)∩ I(N, v2) is a non-empty set and
it is v2−externally stable.
It should be noted that Theorem 1 generalizes some already known results.
Corollary 3 (Shapley (1971) If (N, v) is a convex game, then C(N, v) is a stable set.
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Proof: Since (N, v) is convex, C(N, v) = W (N, v). By Theorem 1 statement 2, taking
v1 = v2 = v, we have that C(N, v) is v-externally stable. This conclude the proof since
C(N, v) is always v-internally stable.
Corollary 4 (Rafels and Tijs, 1997) A game (N, v) is convex if and only if the Weber
set W (N, v) is a stable set.
Proof: If (N, v) is convex, then C(N, v) = W (N, v) and thus the Weber set is (the
unique) stable set. If W (N, v) is a stable set, then W (N, v) ⊆ I(N, v), or equivalently,
(N, v) is zero monotonic. Now, from Theorem 1 statement 3, taking v1 = v2 = v we get
C(N, v) =W (N, v), which implies the convexity of (N, v).
Next, we complete the above result with the analysis of the internal stability for the
cores of convex games involved in a max-decomposition.
Definition 1 Let (N, v) be a game and {λT}∅6=T⊆N its unanimity coordinates. We define
Nv := {∅ 6= S ⊆ N | λS 6= 0} and Nv :=
⋃
S∈Nv
S.
Theorem 2 Let (N, v) be the maximum game generated by the set of games {(N, vt)}t=1,...,k.
If for some t∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k} it is satisfied:
1. (N, vt∗) is convex and vt∗(N) = v(N),
2. vt∗(S) +
∑
i∈N\S v({i}) ≤ v(N), for all S ⊆ N , and
3. R ∩ (N\Nv∗t ) 6= ∅, for all R ∈ ∪
k
j=1,j 6=t∗Nvj ,
then C(N, vt∗) ∩ I(N, v) is a stable set for the game (N, v).
Proof: We can take, without loss of generality, t∗ = 1. External stability comes from
corollary 2 applied to (N, v1) and (N, v). Next we show internal stability. First notice that
statement 3 implies Nv1 6= N and, for all j ∈ N\Nv1 and all x ∈ C(N, v1)∩I(N, v), xj = 0
since 0 = v1({j}) ≤ xj ≤ v1(N) − v1(N\{j}) = 0. Suppose, on the contrary, there are
x, y ∈ C(N, v1)∩ I(N, v) such that y dom
v x. Then, there is a coalition Q ⊂ N such that
yi > xi, for all i ∈ Q, and y(Q) ≤ v(Q). We claim that, for any R ∈ Nv2∪. . .∪Nvk and any
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Q′ ⊆ Q, it holds R * Q′. Indeed, if R ⊆ Q′, by statement 3, there is j ∈ R∩(N\Nv1), and
thus j ∈ Q. Since x, y ∈ C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v), we have xj = yj = 0 and yj > xj, and reach
a contradiction. Therefore, for any R ∈ Nv2 ∪ . . .∪Nvk and any Q
′ ⊆ Q, we have R * Q′,
which implies v2(Q
′) = . . . = vk(Q
′) = 0. In addition, since v = max{v1, . . . , vk} we have
v(Q′) = max{v1(Q
′), 0}, for any Q′ ⊆ Q. In particular, taking Q′ = {i} we get v({i}) ≥ 0,
for all i ∈ Q. As yi > xi for all i ∈ Q and x ∈ I(N, v), we have yi > 0 for all i ∈ Q, which
implies y(Q) > 0. Now, from 0 < y(Q) ≤ v(Q) = max{v1(Q), 0}, we obtain v(Q) = v1(Q).
But then x(Q) < y(Q) ≤ v1(Q), in contradiction with x ∈ C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v). Hence,
C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v) is v-internally stable, which concludes the proof.
In some special cases we can argue that given two ordered games (N, v1) and (N, v2),
with v1 ≤ v2, the intersection C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) is the unique stable set for the game
(N, v2). This is what we state in the next theorem.
Theorem 3 Let (N, v1), (N, v2) be two games with v1 ≤ v2, v1(N) = v2(N), v2({i}) ≥ 0
for all i ∈ N, and such that:
1. for all S, T ∈ Nv1, S ∩ T = ∅, and
2. for all S ∈ Nv1 and for all x ∈ C(N, λS · uS), there is y ∈ C(N, v2) such that
y|S = x|S.
If C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) is a stable set for (N, v2), then it is the unique.
Proof: Suppose there is a stable set V for (N, v2) different from C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2) and
take x ∈ V \ C(N, v1) ∩ I(N, v2). Let T be a minimal coalition (w.r.t. inclusion) such
that x(T ) < v1(T ). Since v2({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , we have v1(T ) > 0. Thus, there is
S ∈ Nv1 such that S ⊆ T. Let T := {S ∈ Nv1 |S ⊆ T} and suppose S ⊂ T, for all S ∈ T .
Then v1(T ) =
∑
S∈T λS =
∑
S∈T v1(S) ≤
∑
S∈T x(S) ≤ x(T ), where the last equality
and the two inequalities follow from statement 1, the minimality of T and the fact that
xi ≥ v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . But this is a contradiction, and thus T = S for some S ∈ T .
In fact, from statement 1 we get T = {T}. Let y ∈ RN be given by yi := xi +
v1(T )−x(T )
|T |
if i ∈ T, and yi := 0 otherwise. Clearly y ∈ C(N, λT · uT ). Now, from statement 2, there
11
is z ∈ C(N, v2) such that z|T = y|T . But then, z dom
v2 x via T , in contradiction with the
internal stability of V . This concludes the proof.
4 Examples and applications
The applicability of both Theorems 2 and 3 is limited but could be used to find some
convex stable sets for a given game. Quoting Aumann (1985), ”finding stable sets involve
a new tour the force of mathematical reasoning for each game or class of games that
is considered. Other than a small number of elementary truisms (e.g. that the core is
contained in every stable set), there is no theory, no tools, certainly no algorithms.” In
this sense, these results are a new tool that not only gives some light on the problem of
existence of stable sets but also remarks the fact that a stable set of a given game can
be the core of another related game, even if the first game is not balanced. The next
examples and applications show some pragmatism of our previous results.
Example: Let (N, v) be a game, with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and v = max{v1, v2, v3}, where
v1 = u{1,2}+u{1,3}+2·u{2,3}+u{1,3,4}, v2 = u{1,5}+u{2,6}+u{3,5}+u{1,2,5}+u{1,3,6} and v3 =
3·u{1,4,6}+2·u{4,6}. Notice that (N, v1), (N, v2) and (N, v3) have positive unanimity coordi-
nates and thus they are convex games. In addition, I(N, v1) = I(N, v2) = I(N, v3), which
implies the N-monotonicity of (N, v). Moreover, Nv1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}}
and N\Nv1 = {5, 6}; Nv2 = {{1, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 6}} and N\Nv2 = {4};
Nv3 = {{1, 4, 6}, {4, 6}} and N\Nv3 = {2, 3, 5}. Now, from Theorem 2 we obtain that
C(N, v1) and C(N, v3) are two different stable sets for the initial game (N, v).
Example: (Lucas, 1992) Let (N, v) be the 5-person game where v(N) = 2, v({1, 2}) =
v({3, 4}) = v({1, 3, 5}) = v({2, 4, 5}) = 1 and v(S) = 0 for all other S ⊂ N . The core
of (N, v) is the segment [(1, 0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0, 0)]. The superadditive cover of this game
is vˆ = max{v1, v2}, where v1 = u{1,2} + u{3,4} and v2 = u{1,3,5} + u{2,4,5}. Notice that
(N, v1) and (N, v2) are convex games with the same imputations set, and thus (N, vˆ) is
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N-monotonic. In addition, Nv1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and N\Nv1 = {5}. Then, from Theorem
2 we obtain that C(N, v1) is a stable set for the game (N, vˆ), and consequently for the
original game (N, v). To show uniqueness, let x = (α, 1− α, 0, 0, 0) ∈ C
(
N, u{1,2}
)
, with
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and y = (0, 0, β, 1 − β, 0) ∈ C
(
N, u{3,4}
)
, with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. It can be easily
checked that x′ = (α, 1− α, 1− α, α, 0), y′ = (1− β, β, β, 1− β, 0) ∈ C(N, vˆ). Now, from
Theorem 3 we conclude that C(N, v1) is the unique stable set for the game (N, v).
Example: Let N = {1, . . . , n} and aS1 , . . . , aSk be an arbitrary family of strictly pos-
itive real numbers associated to the non-empty coalitions S1, . . . , Sk of N . Let v =
max{aS1 · uS1 , . . . , aSk · uSk} and assume, without loss of generality, v(N) = aS1. Here
it is worth to point out that these assumptions are not restrictive in order to analyze
existence of stable sets because any monotonic game can be decomposed in this way (see
Einy, 1988), and any game is strategically equivalent to a monotonic game (see Peleg and
Sudho¨lter, 2007). In this context, by simple applying Theorem 2, if 1 < |Sr| ≤ n, for all
r = 1, . . . , k, and it is satisfied (N \ S1)∩ Sr 6= ∅, for all r = 2, . . . , k, then C(N, aS1 · uS1)
is a stable set for (N, v). This is what happens in the following economic situation.
Example: There are k-different disjoint sets of workers (or types): N1, . . . , Nk, and one
agent who has the capital, denoted by 1. A coalition formed by exactly one agent of each
type and the owner of the capital, that is {1, i1, . . . , ik} where i1 ∈ N1, . . . , ik ∈ Nk, is
called a clique. The worth of a clique is given by a real positive number a{1,i1,...,ik} > 0. Let
N = {1}∪N1∪. . .∪Nk, and suppose that the profit of an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N is zero
if it does not contain any clique, and its profit is the maximum worth generated by the
cliques contained in S, otherwise. This situation can be described as a cooperative game
(N, v) with v := maxi1∈N1,...,ik∈Nk
{
a{1,i1,...,ik} · u{1,i1,...,ik}
}
. Let {1, i∗1, . . . , i
∗
k} be a clique
such that v(N) = a{1,i∗
1
,...,i∗
k
}. Since {1, j1, . . . , jk} ∩ (N \ {1, i
∗
1, . . . , i
∗
k}) 6= ∅, for any j1 ∈
N1, . . . , jk ∈ Nk, if (i
∗
1, . . . , i
∗
k) 6= (j1, . . . , jk), we have that C
(
N, a{1,i∗
1
,...,i∗
k
} · u{1,i∗
1
,...,i∗
k
}
)
is
a stable set for (N, v). Since C(N, v) ⊂ C
(
N, a{1,i∗
1
,...,i∗
k
} · u{1,i∗
1
,...,i∗
k
}
)
, the core C(N, v) is
not a stable set for (N, v).
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The last example shows that rearranging some factors of an initial max-convex de-
composition of a game we can discover other stable sets for the decomposed game.
Example: Let (N, v) be the following game: N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and v({i}) = 0, for all
i ∈ N, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 4}) = 2, v({2, 3}) = v({3, 4}) = 0, v({1, 3}) = 3, v({1, 3, 4}) = 5,
v({2, 4}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 6. It is easy to
check that (N, v) is N -monotonic and it can be decomposed as
v = max
{
6 · u{1,2,3}, 2 · u{1,2}, 3 · u{1,3}, 2 · u{1,4}, 6 · u{2,4}, 5 · u{1,3,4}
}
.
From Theorem 2 we know that C
(
N, 6 · u{2,4}
)
is an stable set for (N, v). However, we
can rewrite
v = max
{
2 · u{1,2} + 3 · u{1,3} + u{1,2,3}, 2 · u{1,4}, 6 · u{2,4}, 5 · u{1,3,4}
}
.
Again applying Theorem 2, C
(
N, 2 · u{1,2} + 3 · u{1,3} + u{1,2,3}
)
is another stable set for
(N, v).
In future works it could be interesting to analyze conditions in terms of a max-convex
decomposition to understand better when a game has no stable sets. Notice that from
n = 5 to n = 9 it is an open problem to get examples without stable sets (if there are
any). Perhaps by using these techniques and results we could be able to solve these open
problems.
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